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 
Abstract— With the ever-increasing reliance on data for 
data-driven applications in power grids, such as event cause 
analysis, the authenticity of data streams has become 
crucially important. The data can be prone to adversarial 
stealthy attacks aiming to manipulate the data such that 
residual-based bad data detectors cannot detect them, and 
the perception of system operators or event classifiers 
changes about the actual event. This paper investigates the 
impact of adversarial attacks on convolutional neural 
network-based event cause analysis frameworks. We have 
successfully verified the ability of adversaries to maliciously 
misclassify events through stealthy data manipulations. The 
vulnerability assessment is studied with respect to the 
number of compromised measurements. Furthermore, a 
defense mechanism to robustify the performance of the 
event cause analysis is proposed. The effectiveness of 
adversarial attacks on changing the output of the 
framework is studied using the data generated by real-time 
digital simulator (RTDS) under different scenarios such as 
type of attacks and level of access to data.  
 
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, convolutional 
neural network (CNN), defense mechanism, event cause analysis, 
real-time digital simulator (RTDS) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
With the proliferation of advanced measurement devices, 
such as phasor measurement units (PMUs) and time-
synchronized transient recorders (TRs), data-driven 
monitoring, operation, and control tools are becoming more 
viable for grid operators. Event diagnostics is one of the 
important monitoring tools that is crucial to increase the 
 
 
situational awareness of abnormal conditions, such as faults, to 
schedule remedial actions and preventive maintenance of the 
critical asset, and to avoid unexpected outages. Nowadays with 
the increase in the use of machine learning (ML) algorithms in 
several power systems applications such as event cause 
analysis, the security and robustness of such methods have 
become an important research issue. Event cause analysis and 
root cause analysis play substantial roles for event diagnostics 
in power grids [1]-[5]. However, ML-based event cause 
analysis frameworks are prone to adversarial data manipulation 
attacks [6]-[13]. Adversaries can attack the data to mislead the 
classifier about the cause or location of events, and 
consequently, make the grid suffer economically or technically. 
Hackers can manipulate the data transmitted to the control 
center; they can also compromise computers that carry out the 
analysis. This paper is motivated by the need on how to make 
ML-based event cause analysis, robust against adversarial and 
undetected attacks. This paper presents an adversarial machine 
learning approach for vulnerability assessment of transient 
events cause analysis in power grids. In this paper, we consider 
adversarial machine learning (AML) for two main reasons. 
First, there might be some perturbations in the measurement 
stream because of malicious attacks. As the perturbations might 
be very small, the traditional residual-based bad data detection 
may most likely not be able to capture the bad data, and the 
manipulated data is used as input to the event cause analysis 
framework. Second, as the number of events in the real-world 
might not be sufficient, the dataset for training the cause 
analysis model is generally complemented with model-based 
simulation results that in many cases might have discrepancies 
with real-world datasets due to uncertainties such as network 
configuration and parameters changes. The results of this paper 
validate the idea of AML for creating an event analytics 
framework that is robust with respect to adversarial conditions 
or cyber-physical uncertainties.  
B. Contributions 
While the concept of AML in power grids is fairly new, it has 
drawn some researchers’ attention. In [12] the authors present a 
data-driven renewable generation model using a generative 
adversarial neural network.  In [13], the authors study the 
vulnerability of load forecasting to data injection attacks. 
However, this paper offers the following unique contributions: 
 Establishing a vulnerability assessment of ML-based event 
cause analysis with respect to the number and location of 
measurements under attacks, to find the most susceptible 
ones for an adversary to attack or for an operator to defend.  
 Presenting a defense mechanism to make the event cause 
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analysis framework robust against stealthy data tampering 
attacks. Additionally, the defense mechanism is important 
because of potential discrepancies between real-world and 
model-based datasets because of uncertainties in the 
network parameters or measurement noise. 
 Validating the proposed approach using the datasets 
generated using real-time digital simulator (RTDS).  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the adversarial machine learning event cause analysis 
framework. In Section III, the results are presented. Finally, 
Section IV presents the conclusion and future work. 
II. ADVERSARIAL ATTACK ON EVENT CAUSE ANALYSIS 
 There are several ways of cyberattacks, such as denial of 
service (DoS), or false data injection attacks (FDIA). This paper 
focuses on one of the most challenging cyber-attacks as 
malicious data tampering attacks with small perturbations on 
voltage or current data that can remain undetected by bad data 
detectors. In this section, the attack models are formulated using 
adversarial machine learning framework. 
A. Adversarial Goal for Event Misclassification 
An adversarial attack is composed of maliciously changing 
the voltage or current data in such a way that the variations are 
almost not noticeable to the human operators, and are missed by 
residual-based bad data detectors as well. The altered voltage or 
current dataset is called adversarial data, and when fed to event 
classifier would be misclassified, while the original one is 
correctly classified. The attacker, in our study, attempts to force 
the target model to misclassify inputs in any class different from 
their true class.  In other words, the adversary tries to craft a 
new modified version of the input ݔԦ, named adversarial data, 
and denoted as ݔ∗ሬሬሬሬԦ, misclassified by the original ML model T: 
T(ݔ∗ሬሬሬሬԦ)് T(ݔԦ). In this paper, the adversarial data (i.e., voltage) 
will be obtained by solving the following optimization problem: 
 
ݔ∗ሬሬሬሬԦ ൌ ݔԦ+arg min{ݖԦ: T(ݔԦ ൅ ݖԦ)് T(ݔԦ)}=	ݔԦ ൅ ߜ௫Ԧ             (1)  
where ܺ is the matrix of voltage streams from measurement 
locations over the sampling period, ߜ௫Ԧ is a small perturbation 
that is added to the original matrix of voltage streams and can 
still be unnoticeable as the adversary designs it to avoid being 
captured by the bad data detector. Doing so, it forces the 
classifier to be fooled and the system operators to make wrong 
decisions, and therefore, the power quality and root cause 
analysis, and preventive maintenance scheduling frameworks 
are not trusted.  
B. Type of Adversarial Attack 
In general, there are two types of attacks that adversaries can 
implement; white-box and black-box attacks. In white-box 
attacks, the adversaries have access to the ML model’s 
parameters, such as architecture, number, type, and size of 
layers. In black-box attacks, the adversaries have no access to 
the aforementioned parameters. In other words, the adversaries 
craft the adversarial manipulation using its own model which 
might be a different model compared to the original model or 
maybe crafted with no model at all. In this type of attack, which 
is much harder compared to the white-box attack, adversaries 
do not need to know the details of the ML-based event cause 
analysis framework to compromise it. In cyber-physical power 
systems, there are different layers of security which makes it 
difficult for adversaries to have access to the parameters of ML-
based frameworks inside utilities’ control rooms. This is 
another reason to consider black-box attacks which rely on only 
having access to a small portion of the voltage and current 
dataset.  
C. Adversarial Data Repository 
It is assumed that the adversary has been monitoring the 
power grid for enough period of time or compromised 
computers inside utilities, and has gathered information about 
past events. Using an unsupervised clustering algorithm, the 
adversary can create different clusters of potential events. 
Based on the obtained clusters, the adversary categorizes the 
events into different labeled classes. Using the labeled dataset, 
the adversary makes its own substitute ML-based classifier for 
launching future attacks on the system.  
D. Substitute Model for Adversaries 
As mentioned before, based on a small repository of the 
collected dataset, the adversary seeks to make its own model, 
called substitute model, and to launch attacks by making small 
undetectable perturbations on voltage measurement streams. 
The goal of the substitute model is not to achieve the optimal 
accuracy but to learn similar decision boundaries as the original 
event cause analysis framework and make a close 
approximation of it. The adversarially manipulated voltage 
stream would then have the best chance of success for fooling 
the classifier used inside the target utility. 
The question that comes to mind is “How can the adversary 
select the architecture of the substitute model when it doesn’t 
know anything about the architecture of the target model?” 
 In fact, the structure of the original classifier is not an 
obstacle for the adversary since it has some knowledge about it 
in terms of the input-output relationship. For instance, it is 
known that the original classifier’s inputs are voltage or 
currents streams, and the outputs are the type of events. 
Therefore, the adversary can create an approximate structure for 
the substitute classifier.  For the event cause analysis problem, 
the convolutional neural network (CNN) is suitable since it 
incorporates the spatiotemporal feature representations of 
events [14]. In addition, it is shown in [6] that the architecture 
and parameters of deep neural network substitute models have 
an insignificant impact on succeeding the adversarial goal. 
Furthermore, it is always possible for the adversary to examine 
a large set of architecture to find the best performance for 
crafting attacks. Once the suitable substitute classifier is 
selected, the adversary uses the collected dataset to train the 
model for making adversarial data manipulation  
E. Adversarial Data Crafting 
After training the substitute classifier model, the adversary 
uses it to generate adversarially manipulated voltage samples. 
In this paper, we implement an approach introduced in [10] by 
Goodfellow et al, namely, fast gradient sign method (FGSM) 
for crafting the adversarial samples. In this method, given a 
model ܵ with the cost function of ܿሺܵ, ݔԦ, ݕሻ, where ݔԦ is the 
original data (i.e., voltage matrix over time and location), ݕ is 
  
the original label corresponding to the original data, the 
adversary can generate an adversarial sample, ݔ∗ሬሬሬሬԦ ൌ 	ݔԦ ൅ ߜ௫Ԧ by 
adding the following perturbation: 
 
ߜ௫Ԧ ൌ ߝ	ݏ݅݃݊ሺ׏௫Ԧc	ሺS, ݔԦ, yሻሻ                         (2) 
 
where ߝ is the value of the input parameter that controls the 
perturbation's value. This value is selected such that the 
residual-based bad data detector fails to flag it as a potential bad 
data. As the value of ߝ increases, the chance of the adversarial 
input being misclassified by the original classifier increases, 
while it also increases the chance of being detected by operators 
or the bad data detector. It should be noted that while the 
adversary perturbs the input, it tries to stay stealthy as well. 
Therefore, the following constrained optimization problem is 
solved: 
min ‖ߜ௫Ԧ‖௣ 
w.r.t. |ݔԦ ൅ ߜ௫Ԧ	|<1                                (3) 
where ‖. ‖௣ is the p-norm. 
In other words, the adversary attempts to compute the loss 
function’s gradient to decide in which direction the values must 
be perturbed. After making the substitute model trained and 
tested, the adversary intercepts voltage streams before being 
used by the event classifier at the control center to perturb them 
in a way that the classifier misclassifies the real underlying 
event as a different event. 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
In this section, the case study, results, and discussions about 
events cause analysis are presented.  
A. Test Case 
To assess the validity of the proposed methodology, the 
WSCC 9-bus system [15] is implemented on the real-time 
digital simulator (RTDS) facility at the University of Nevada, 
Reno (UNR).  Three software-based TRs are located at bus 4, 
7, and 9 which measure three-phase voltages at these buses. The 
simulation time step is 50 µsec corresponding to 20 kHz 
sampling rate. The measurements are recorded for two cycles 
(2/60	 ൎ 	34 ms, 34 ms× 20 kHz = 680 samples) before any 
protection devices operate. This duration is determined based 
on extensive studies of different events. This is also practically 
desirable as high-frequency measurements streaming can start 
once an event is detected by the device, and stop after a pre-
determined period, due to the very large communication 
bandwidth required for transmitting such large datasets. Such a 
concept exists in line monitoring devices manufactured by 
Sentient Energy [16].  
B. Events Descriptions 
In this paper, the following three events in power 
transmission grids are modeled. The simulated events cover a 
diverse set of signatures, such as type, the location, inception 
angles, and different values that can occur in power grids. 
 Class 1 (Line Energization): This class is simulated by 
closing one end of the line at the time ݐ଴ while the other 
end of the line is already closed. The switching time (ݐ଴) 
varies from 8 ms to 23 ms with a step of 1 ms (covering 
the whole period of voltage waves,  1/60	 ൎ 	17 ms). This 
experiment is repeated for each switch resulting in 
6×2×16=192 experiments. For synchronized operation of 
circuit breakers at both ends of a line, first the sending end 
of the line at ݐ଴ is closed and the receiving end is closed at ݐ଴ ൅ ߂ݐ, where ݐ଴ changes from 8 ms to 23 ms and ߂ݐ 
changes from 0 msec to 3 ms with one ms intervals. The 
delay (߂ݐ) is added to take the practical consideration of 
synchronization into account. This experiment is repeated 
for each line resulting in 6×4×16=384 experiments. 
Therefore, the total experiment in this class is 576. 
 Class 2 (Capacitor Bank Energization): Energization 
inrush is a transient occurring when the capacitor at the bus 
is energized. This class is simulated based on switching of 
the capacitor banks on 3 buses. For the capacitor bank 
energization, it is assumed three capacitors are located at 
buses 5, 6, and 8 with capacities of 25, 50, 75, and 100 
MVAR. In addition, the simulations carried out in 16 
different inception angles to account for different intensity 
of switching. The total number of experiments in class 2 is 
3×4×16=192. 
 Class 3 (Fault): This class covers all the faults in the 
system, including single-phase, two-phase, and three-
phase. This class embodies a wide range of parameters 
including fault resistance, locations, and inception angles. 
It is assumed the faults happen every 20% of the lines, 
therefore, four locations on each line. Three inception 
angles are considered to account for different switching 
moments. The fault events are simulated for fault resistor 
values of 0.1 and 5 ohms. Therefore, the total number of 
simulated experiments for this class is 6×3×4×4×2=576.  
C. Machine Learning-Based Event Cause analysis 
The original three-phase voltages are transformed into the 
modal domain and mode-1 voltage (i.e., the aerial mode) is fed 
as the input to the CNN-based event cause analysis to identify 
the cause of an event. It should be noted that for each simulated 
event, all the mode-1 voltages from the sensor locations are 
stacked on top of each other to form a spatiotemporal 
measurement matrix which is then converted into a 2D image 
for CNN training and classification. An extensive number of 
training and evaluation scenarios are performed to discover the 
most suitable CNN parameters, i.e., the number of 
convolutional layers, fully connected layers, number and size 
of the filters, etc. The optimal CNN structure is as follows: one 
convolutional layer with ten 2×20 filters, the stride of 2, one 
ReLU for the activation layer, and one fully connected layer, 
with softmax layer for the classification as the final stage. The 
classifier is trained on a single CPU using the Adam optimizer 
with the number epoch of 6, batch size of 8, and the initial 
learning rate of 0.001.  
D. Adversarial Data Generation  
Fig. 1 (a) illustrate the adversarial samples generated using 
the FGSM algorithm. It shows how the voltage signals 
originally corresponding to an event can be altered to force a 
classifier to misclassify. In each image of Fig. 1, the y-axis 
represents the location of voltage measurement (three buses), 
and the x-axis represents the number of samples (680 samples). 
It needs to be noted that the voltage streams are normalized 
from 0 to 1. The images on the diagonal locations show the 
  
original voltage streams, while the off-diagonal images show 
the adversarially perturbed voltage samples. For instance, the 
second image in the first row of Fig. 1 (a) shows that by adding 
a small perturbation to the original voltage samples, the 
classifier  is forced to misclassify the event as class 2, while the 
image is not undergone a noticeable alteration, and can still 
remain undetected by the conventional bad data detector. In 
addition, to compare the level of stealthy of adversarial voltages 
generated by the FGSM algorithm, another type of attack, 
namely, Jacobian-based Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [8], is 
used to generate perturbed voltage streams as shown in Fig. 1. 
(b). As it can be seen, the adversarially generated voltage 
samples, in the second case, is very noticeable that can be 
detected by operators or by the bad data detector.  
 
 
(c)                                                   (d)                                                           
Fig.1. adversarial data generated by (a) FGSM algorithm, (b) JSMA algorithm 
E. Evaluation of Adversarial Attacks Success 
The total number of 1344 events is divided into 940 (70% 
of the dataset) training set, and 204 (ൎ15% of the dataset) 
testing set, to evaluate the original classifier. The remaining 200 
events are divided into 150, and 50 for training and testing of 
the substitute model used by the adversary. The architecture of 
the substitute model is as follows. Five filters of 2×10, with the 
stride of 1, one ReLU for the activation layer, one fully 
connected layer, and softmax layer for the classification. The 
accuracies for the original classification model and substitute 
model are calculated as 99.50% and 94%, respectively. To 
evaluate the effects of adversarial voltage samples on the event 
cause analysis performance, two metrics are introduced: 
success rate, and transferability. Success rate is the percentage 
of the adversarial voltages that are misclassified by the model. 
The transferability is the percentage of the adversarial voltages 
crafted according to the substitute model and are misclassified 
by the original classifier. The transferability is more important 
since the final goal of any adversary is to force the original 
classifier to misclassify the tampered data without being 
detected. Fig. 2 (a) shows the success and transferability rates 
for different values of perturbation coefficient (ε) with the 
infinite-norm in Eq. (3). As it can be seen, as ε increases, the 
success and transferability rates also increase. That is because 
an increase in the value of ߝ	increases the perturbation on the 
original voltage stream and therefore results in forcing the 
original classifier to misclassify the adversarially crafted data. 
It can be seen that for ε=0.07 the adversarial data are able to 
fool the target model by 76% which is very effective. In 
addition, based on the closeness of success rate and 
transferability, it is obvious that the substitute classifier 
performs well in approximating the decision boundaries of the 
original classifier. However, bigger values of the perturbation 
coefficient increase the chance of being detected by the bad data 
detector.  
F. Impact of Attack Order on Attack Success  
As we can recall from Eq. (3), to create the adversarial 
voltage streams, the perturbations can be optimized with respect 
to different norms. The FGSM attack is originally optimized for 
infinite-norm as it is implemented in this paper [7]. However, 
to evaluate the effect of different norms on adversarial voltage 
generation, two other norms are studied: 1-norm and 2-norm. 
Fig. 2 (b) shows a comparison between these three norms with 
different perturbation levels.  As it can be seen, in attacks with 
infinite-norm, the transferability rate of adversarial voltages 
increases with the increasing perturbation values. However, the 
attacks based on 1-norm and 2-norm are not successful and the 
transferability rate stays below 5%. 
 
  
 
Fig.2. (a) Success rate and transferability of adversarial data with respect to ε, 
(b) Transferability of adversarial data for different norm orders 
G. Impact of Level of Access to Data by Attackers 
Another important issue is the amount of dataset available 
to adversaries. The amount of data available to the adversary 
can be a function of time, the extent of cybersecurity breaches, 
stealthy level, and usefulness of previously collected data for 
clustering the events. In this paper, the dataset available to train 
the adversarial substitute classifier is assumed to be 25, 50, 100, 
125, and 150 events. As can be seen in Fig. 3 (a), as the number 
of datasets increases, the adversary is more likely to force the 
original classifier to misclassify the adversarially tampered 
voltage stream. This is because of the closeness of the substitute 
model to the original classifier. 
H. Vulnerability with Respect to the Number of Compromised 
Measurements 
In this paper, the vulnerability of the CNN-based event 
cause analysis with respect to the number of compromised 
measurements is studied. Generally, an adversary may not have 
access to all the streaming measurements or past events. This 
can be mostly due to strong cybersecurity measures inside 
substations or utilities. Therefore, the vulnerability analysis 
allows the adversary to spend its time and money on more 
vulnerable substations and still perform a successful attack on 
the event cause analysis framework. On the other hand, the 
vulnerability analysis is of interest to system operators, since 
they can decide to reinforce more susceptible substations by 
better defending them against adversaries. To simulate the 
vulnerability assessment on k nodes, it is assumed that if the 
input voltage matrix is ݊ ൈ ݐ, the adversary has only access to 
݇ of n measurements. Therefore, the adversarial voltages 
crafted by the substitute model will be a ݇ ൈ ݐ	voltage matrix 
which will be combined with the rest of ݊ െ ݇ ൈ ݐ “clean” data 
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and used by the original classifier. Fig. 3 (b) shows the result of 
the vulnerability assessment for three measurement locations on 
the test case. The attacks are made by the perturbation value of 
ߝ ൌ 0.1. The first observation is that as the number of the 
attacked locations increases, the adversary is more successful in 
forcing the original classifier to misclassify the voltage streams 
with adversarial samples inside them. In addition, when the 
adversary attacks all the nodes, the attack is significantly more 
effective; however, more likely to be detected, Another 
observation is that attacks on buses close to the edge of the grid 
(e.g., bus 4) result in less successful misclassification. 
 
  
Fig. 3. (a) Transferability of adversarial data with respect to the size of 
available adversary dataset (b) Vulnerability assessment based on the 
compromised nodes 
I. Defense Mechanism   
Finally, we look at the problem from the operator’s point of 
view. Although the adversary can always make malicious 
attacks to force the original classifier to misclassify the stream 
of voltages with tampered samples, the defender can also make 
the original classifier more robust by finding the weak points 
and fortifying it to reduce the chances of misclassification. In 
this paper, we proceed with one of the most popular defense 
mechanisms, namely adversarial training, for reinforcing the 
original classifier and re-evaluating the effect of adversarial 
voltage samples. It is demonstrated that retraining the model 
using the adversarial samples can significantly increase the 
robustness of CNN-based event classifiers [9], [10].  
 
 
Fig.4. Transferability for the defended target model vs original target model   
 
The adversarial voltages are generated for all 940 training 
sets and are augmented into the training set for retraining the 
original classifier. The original classifier is retrained with the 
1880 dataset and tested on the adversarial data sets crafted by 
the adversary using the substitute model. Fig. 4 shows the 
misclassification rate of adversarial voltage streams created by 
the adversary for different perturbation parameters on both the 
original and retrained classifiers. As it can be seen from the 
figure, after retraining the original classifier by injecting the 
adversarial, the adversarial data made by the adversary have 
little impact on the classification output of the original 
classifier, only 5% even with ߝ ൌ 0.3 which is a very large 
value, and can be easily detected by the bad data detector.  
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, an adversarial attack model on power grids’ 
event cause analysis frameworks is presented. It is shown that 
data-driven event cause analysis in power grids are vulnerable 
to adversarially crafted data sets that even bad data detectors 
may fail to detect them. This paper also presents a vulnerability 
assessment to find the weak substations from adversarial 
attackers’ or operators’ perspective. Moreover, a defense 
mechanism for robustifying the original convolutional neural 
network-based event cause analysis framework is presented. As 
future work, we will implement the proposed methodology on 
larger networks with more events considering the effect of 
different sampling rates. Exploring other attacks such as Carlini 
and Wagner [7] and Deepfool [11] will be investigated. Finally, 
the robustness of the system with different defense mechanisms 
such as defensive distillation will be studied.   
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